On the positive correlation between education and fertility

intentions in Europe: Individual- and country-level evidence by Testa, Maria Rita
ePubWU Institutional Repository
Maria Rita Testa
On the positive correlation between education and fertility intentions in
Europe: Individual- and country-level evidence
Article (Published)
(Refereed)
Original Citation:
Testa, Maria Rita (2014) On the positive correlation between education and fertility intentions in
Europe: Individual- and country-level evidence. Advances in Life Course Research, 21. pp. 28-42.
ISSN 1040-2608
This version is available at: http://epub.wu.ac.at/4669/
Available in ePubWU: October 2015
ePubWU, the institutional repository of the WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, is
provided by the University Library and the IT-Services. The aim is to enable open access to the
scholarly output of the WU.
This document is the publisher-created published version.
http://epub.wu.ac.at/
On the positive correlation between education and fertility
intentions in Europe: Individual- and country-level evidence§
Maria Rita Testa *
Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital (IIASA, VID/O¨AW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography,
Austrian Academy of Sciences, Wohllebengasse 12-14, 6th Floor, 1040 Vienna, Austria
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Welthandelsplatz 1, Building D4, 1020 Vienna, Austria
1. Introduction
Fertility intentions play a central role in explaining
contemporary fertility trends: they are among the
strongest predictors of subsequent fertility, and operate
as key proximate variables in predicting fertility behaviour
(Ajzen, 1991; Schoen, Astone, Kim, & Nathanson, 1999).
The complex effect of education on fertility has been
widely studied in the literature, and is a highly relevant topic
in research on reproductive behaviour (Kohler & Rodgers,
2003). The diffusion of modern contraception has not
levelled the socio-economic differentials in completed
fertility (Sweet & Rindfuss, 1983), as women who are
college graduates still tend to have fewer children than
women with high school degrees or lower levels of
education (Yang & Morgan, 2003). Fertility intentions are
an important channel through which education affects
fertility. However, the relationship between fertility inten-
tions and education is not necessarily the same as the
relationship between actual fertility and education and little
empirical research has been devoted to this issue. Empirical
evidence indicates that highly educated people intend to
have more children than less educated women (Heiland,
Prskawetz, & Sanderson, 2008), but they ultimately have
fewer children (Bongaarts, 2001; Quesnel-Valle´e & Morgan,
2003). Moreover, highly educated women revise their birth
intentions downwards more frequently than less educated
women (Iacovou & Tavares, 2011), especially when they are
near the end of their fertile years (Liefbroer, 2009).
A positive and statistically significant cross-country
correlation between the mean ultimately intended family
size (the number of children already born plus the number of
children the individual plans to have in the future) and the
proportion of highly educated women of reproductive ages
(20–45) has been observed in the three cross-sectional
rounds of the Eurobaromter (EB) survey conducted in 2001,
2006, and 2011 (Testa & Grilli, 2006; Testa, 2010, 2012a).
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It would be particularly valuable to gain more knowl-
edge about the impact of education on fertility decision-
making in Europe given that in many European countries
the share of highly educated women has been increasing
over time while fertility has been declining.
The objective of the study reported here is to estimate
how women’s level of education influences women’s
lifetime fertility intentions through both individual- and
aggregate-level effects and to illustrate the responsiveness
of such relationship to different demographic and socio-
economic characteristics.
The study includes 27 countries of the European Union
in which the two Eurobarometer surveys were undertaken,
at the beginning of 2006 and 2011, respectively. I focus on
lifetime fertility intentions, i.e., the number of children
planned for the whole reproductive career, and estimate
models for childless, parents with one child, and parents
with two children separately because of the fundamentally
different process involved in the decision to have a first, a
second, or a higher birth order child.
The research aim is pursued by answering the following
research questions: (1) Are women’s educational levels
and intended family sizes positively correlated? (2) What
factors are responsible for this positive correlation? (3)
How does this correlation vary from country to country;
and, within countries, among women at different parities?
(4) Does education at contextual level have an impact on
woman’s fertility intentions above and beyond that of her
own education?
These are important questions to answer for both
theory and policy reasons. They matter in terms of theory
because they allow us to test the appropriateness of
conventional explanatory and predictive models of deci-
sion-making about family formation for the target group of
highly educated people. They matter in terms of policy
because a gap between the desired and the actual family
size has been found in European countries (Goldstein, Lutz,
& Testa, 2003). This gap is particularly large among highly
educated women, who typically have lower actual fertility
levels but higher reproductive intentions than their less
educated counterparts (Testa, 2012a). A reduction of such a
gap is widely considered to be an important goal.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.
First, I review the relevant literature on fertility and
fertility intentions at macro and micro level. Next, I present
research hypotheses, data, and methodology. This is
followed by a description and interpretation of the main
statistical findings and a discussion of possible caveats
inherent to the analysis.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Explanations of low fertility
A variety of theories have been developed to explain
low fertility. Each of these theories proposes a different
approach that emphasises a particular set of determinants.
The most relevant theories for the study of fertility
behaviour of highly educated women are the economic and
the gender theories because they explicitly consider the
effect of women’s working career on their childbearing.
The socio-economic explanation for low fertility
focuses on the direct and indirect opportunity costs of
having children (Becker, 1981a,b). According to this theory,
women’s increased economic independence, which is
achieved through improved education and higher labour
force participation, reduces the gains from marriage based
on the interdependence of the traditional gender division
of labour in the family, and increases the relative costs of
childbearing. In other words, it is assumed that women
forgo earnings to care for children at home, or that they
reduce their work hours.
A second group of theories identify gender systems and
gender inequality as the main sources of fertility differ-
entials across countries, and are often used to explain the
lowest-low fertility found in southern Mediterranean
countries. McDonald (2000) has suggested that very low
fertility may be the result of a hiatus between high levels of
gender equity in individual-oriented institutions and
sustained gender inequity in family-oriented social insti-
tutions. While women have, in recent years, had the same
opportunities as men in education, and to some extent in
the labour market, this has not occurred within the family.
Women have become more empowered in their decision-
making in relation to both household labour and fertility
because their high levels of education allow them to
question traditional roles (McDonald, 2006). According to
the gender theory, the countries that successfully adapted
to the demise of ‘traditional family’ based on marriage and
male breadwinner model record higher fertility levels than
countries with incomplete gender and family ‘‘revolu-
tions’’ (Esping-Andersen, 2009; McDonald, 2000).
2.2. Education and reproductive decision-making
The theory of planned behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991)
posits that intentions are the most proximate determinant
of the corresponding behaviour. According to this theory,
intentions are formed under the immediate influence of
three groups of factors: (a) personal positive and negative
attitudes towards the behaviour, i.e., having a child; (b)
subjective norms, i.e., perceived social pressure to engage
or not to engage in the behaviour; and (c) perceived
behavioural control, i.e., the ability to perform the
behaviour, which may depend, for example, on the
availability of housing, income, or other resources. Billari,
Philipov, and Testa (2009), who have applied the general
theory to the case of fertility, showed that the transition to
parenthood is mainly driven by the existent normative
pressure and individual personal attitudes towards child-
bearing, while perceived behavioural control plays a
bigger role in the decision to have a second child. It may
be assumed that perceived behavioural control has a
positive effect on the fertility intentions of highly
educated women (Testa, 2010). The question is whether,
and to which extent, the positive effect exerted by the
perceived behavioural control might be counterbalanced
by a negative effect exerted by the norms and attitudes.
Norms contribute substantially to the negative effects of
educational enrolment on women’s fertility (Billari &
Philipov, 2004; Blossfeld & Huinink, 1991; Morgan &
Rackin, 2010), which demonstrates the importance of
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enrolment itself, regardless of the achieved educational
level. Reverse causality may also be at stake here:
empirical studies have shown that women with advanced
degrees have lower completed fertility on the average
because women who have one or more children early are
more likely to leave (or not enter) long educational tracks
and never achieve a high educational level (Cohen, Kravdal,
and Keilman, 2011). In the motivational traits-desires-
intentions-behaviour theoretical structure (Miller, 1994),
individuals go through a sequence of steps that starts with
psychological traits, such as childbearing motivations, and
are activated by desires, which are in turn translated into
intentions. The final outcome of the childbearing decision
process is a conception and a fertility event related to it, such
as childbirth or an induced or spontaneous abortion. Traits
are defined as a disposition to feel, desires are wishes that do
not lead to action, and intentions are conscious commit-
ments to act that take into account the perceived desires of
significant others, especially of the partner, and other
situational factors. Miller (1992) demonstrated that child-
bearing motivations are negatively associated with educa-
tional level because having a high level of education gives
women a higher degree of autonomy which in turn
promotes activities competitive with childbearing and leads
to wishes for fewer children. The exposure to life course
paths competitive with childbearing, such as the completion
of education, also plays a crucial role in explaining the
transition to parenthood (Barber, 2001). The sign of the
correlation between women’s education and reproductive
intentions depends on whether the desires of significant
others and the situational constraints considered by highly
educated women in their decision-making process counter-
balance the negative effects that stem from their increased
level of autonomy.
Highly educated women tend to substitute child
numbers with child quality (Becker & Lewis, 1973). Since
childbearing and childrearing are time-intensive, an
increase in wage rates induces a negative substitution
effect on the demand for children (Becker, 1965). A
woman’s income is, therefore, negatively associated with
childbearing, as having a higher income level implies that
opportunity costs associated with having children are
higher. For men, by contrast, the positive income effect
tends to dominate, as they spend less time raising children,
although the magnitude of these effects will vary across
countries and birth parities (Butz & Ward, 1979).
Consistent with this view is the hypothesis that the time
demands and the values associated with higher-status
occupations compete with positive childbearing motiva-
tions (Miller, 1992), and induce women in such positions to
postpone the birth of their first child in order to achieve an
optimal trade-off between human capital investments and
career plans (Gustafsson, 2001).
The main mechanisms through which women’s educa-
tional level is expected to be positively correlated with
women’s (or couples’) fertility intentions are linked to the
income effects postulated in the economic theory and to
the gender equality effects envisaged in the gender theory.
Highly educated women have higher average earnings that
can make a plan for larger family more realistic and
affordable; this is especially true because they usually have
a partner who is also highly educated and for which the
income effect clearly dominates (Becker, 1981a,b). Simi-
larly, highly educated women are more often in gender
equal partnerships in which the man contributes sub-
stantially to the housework and childcare duties and this
can encourage plans for larger families (Mills, Mencarini,
Tanturri, & Begall, 2008).
3. Research hypotheses
Highly educated women are exposed to life course
paths that compete with childbearing, but they do not
necessarily plan to have smaller family sizes than less
educated women (Hayford, 2009; Heiland et al., 2008;
Mills et al., 2008). Some women in high-status occupations
may intend to have fewer children from the beginning of
their reproductive careers (Friedman, Hechter, and Kana-
zawa, 1994), while others may later decide to forgo having
some of the children they had initially planned to have
over the course of their reproductive careers (Iacovou &
Tavares, 2011). Better educated women are more prone to
postpone having children than less educated women
(Heaton, Jacobson, and Holland, 1999; Schoen et al.,
1999), and, consequently, they are more likely to have
fewer children than they had initially intended. The
mechanisms that could account for this are: (1) declining
fecundity with age, which may result in involuntary
childlessness; (2) repeated postponements, because of
competing activities; (3) lack of partner, or partnership
instability (Morgan & Rackin, 2010). It is unclear whether
and to what extent highly educated women are able to
anticipate the negative effects of postponement on their
reproductive careers. This ability may be captured by the
level of certainty attached to their fertility intentions since
uncertainty may be an acknowledgement that delaying
childbearing could lead to forgoing having children
(Morgan, 1981, 1982). We could expect that after the
transition to parenthood the limited time left out for
having additional children is reflected in a higher level of
uncertainty attached to the reproductive plans and that
after controlling for this uncertainty the intentions of
highly educated women become lower than those of the
less educated counterparts.
A crucial issue in investigating the relationship between
women’s human capital and fertility intentions is whether
the positive income effect is greater than the negative
substitution effect. I focus on three different channels
through which the positive effect of the women’s increased
education on fertility decisions may be strengthened:
availability of childcare services, gender equality, and
economic conditions.
An important extension to the argument provided by
Becker is based on the assumption that women’s fertility
decisions depend not only on their wages, but also on the
availability of external childcare. At the highest level of
education, the income effect may be greater than the
substitution effect, especially when childcare can be
purchased in the market (Del Boca & Pasqua, 2005;
Ermisch, 1989).
Cross-sectional studies of differences in the relation-
ship between women’s human capital and fertility
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decisions might reflect the differences across countries in
the provision of childcare services. I formulate my first
research hypothesis as follows:
HP1. The relationship between women’s level of educa-
tion and lifetime fertility intentions is positive in those
countries in which the availability of childcare services
offsets the high opportunity costs paid by highly qualified
women for having children.
Both of these effects are assumed to be more
pronounced after the birth of a first child.
In addition to the income and the substitution effects, a
third mechanism linking income to childbearing is the
price of time effect, which refers to the ability to combine
work and family (Becker, 1981a, 1981b). If gender relations
within the couple move in a more egalitarian direction in
response to the increased economic opportunities of highly
educated women, the lower price of time effect can
compensate for the higher substitution effect among
highly educated women (Oppenheimer, 1994). The litera-
ture has shown that, in egalitarian gender systems, the
price of time effect may be reduced for women (Jansen &
Liefbroer, 2006; Liefbroer and Corijn, 1999), and that, in
countries in which high levels of gender equity in
education and the labour market are combined with low
levels of equity in the family, fertility is particularly low
(McDonald, 2000). I formulate my second research
hypothesis as follows:
HP2. The relationship between women’s level of educa-
tion and lifetime fertility intentions is positive in those
countries in which egalitarian gender roles in the family
and in the market offset the high price of time paid by
highly qualified women for having children.
As we saw for hypothesis 1, the effects are assumed to
be particularly pronounced after the birth of a first child,
when a woman has a better idea of the amount of help with
childcare duties she can expect to receive from her partner
(Mills et al., 2008).
A positive relationship has been detected between
child-timing intention (i.e., the intention to have a child in
the next three years) and a country’s level of GDP per capita
(Testa, 2010): i.e., people living in countries with a high
GDP per capita tend to anticipate the birth of a second
child. This finding is in line with studies showing a positive
link between fertility and economic development (Luci &
The´venon, 2011; Myrskyla¨, Kohler, & Billari, 2009) and
suggests that reproduction and economic development are
not necessarily negatively associated. I therefore formulate
my third research hypothesis as follows:
HP3. The relationship between women’s level of educa-
tion and lifetime fertility intentions is positive in those
countries with a higher level of GDP per capita.
Here I assume that a country’s favourable economic
conditions may have positive repercussions for fertility, as
has been shown in previous studies (Luci & The´venon,
2011). There could be several mechanisms driving such a
relationship: the high levels of GDP per capita are also
typically linked with an increased level of well-being and
life satisfaction (Testa, 2012a) which may bolster fertility
and fertility intentions, especially those of highly educated
women.
4. Data and methods
4.1. The sample
The empirical analysis is based on the Eurobarometer
surveys carried out in 2006 and 2011 in the 27 EU
countries. In each of these surveys the stratified sampling
procedure assures nearly equal probability samples of
about 1000 respondents in each of the countries. The
sample size allows equally precise estimates for small and
large countries, as well as to make comparisons between
sub-groups broken down by sex, age, education, marital
status, and so on. The surveys used a single uniform
questionnaire design, with particular attention being paid
to equivalent question wording across languages.
After having pooled together the 2006 and the 2011 EB
rounds, the analytical sample consists of 9452 women
aged 20–45 who answered the question on fertility
intentions: 3332 childless, 2627 with one child, and
3493 with two children. The non-response rate was
slightly less than 10%. A missing answer may be sympto-
matic of certain fertility plans (Morgan, 1981, 1982).
However, I simply excluded from the analysis all indivi-
duals who did not report any intended family size in order
to avoid potential complications given the absence of
auxiliary information on this item. The results obtained
from the analysis run on the sub-set of valid responses are
reliable under the standard ‘‘missing at random assump-
tion’’ (Little & Rubin, 2002).
The models are formally based on two levels: indivi-
duals and countries (referred to as ‘‘clusters’’) as described
in Table 1. As is shown in this table, the hierarchical
structure is quite unbalanced. This lack of balance is not a
problem, as it is efficiently handled by maximum-like-
lihood methods. The number of clusters and their sizes are
sufficient to achieve high levels of power and accuracy of
the asymptotic distributions of the estimators (Stegmuel-
ler, 2013; Snijders & Bosker, 1999), and thus allow for
reliable inferences. Multilevel models assume random
sampling at all levels, while our survey design in fact does
not use sampling at the country level. Even in such a
circumstance, multilevel models could be useful because
they allow the explicit inclusion of country-level expla-
natory variables and country-level residual variation
(Hox, vand de Schoot, & Matthijsse, 2012).
For the estimates computation I used the programme
gllamm which runs in the statistical package Stata and
estimates GLAMMs (Generalised Linear Latent and Mixed
Models) by maximum likelihood, i.e., via a maximisation
algorithm with adaptive quadrature, assuming Gaussian
random effects (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004).
4.2. Response variable: lifetime fertility intentions
The response variable, i.e., the intended number of
children, was measured through the following item: ‘‘How
many more children do you intend to have?’’ A range from
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zero to up to six children was given in the questionnaire as
a response option. The prospective item was asked
immediately after the question about the number of
children already had (‘‘How many children, if any, have you
had?’’) and was clearly intended to provide information
about the number of births respondents plan to have over
(the rest of) their reproductive careers. Neither of the
above-mentioned questions made a distinction between
biological and adopted children. Moreover, since pregnan-
cies are not measured in the survey, it cannot be excluded
that pregnant women reported the children already
conceived at the time of the survey as expected to be
born, i.e., in the intended component of their ultimately
intended family size.
The response variable was coded as a four-category
variable: zero, one, two, and three or more children. Values
greater than or equal to three were, in light of their low
frequency, collapsed into a single category.
Certainty levels of lifetime fertility intentions were also
used. They were measured through the following survey
item: ‘‘How certain are you that you will have the number of
children that you have just mentioned?’’ Response options
were: ‘‘very sure’’, ‘‘fairly sure’’, ‘‘not very sure’’, and ‘‘not at
all sure’’. All of the respondents who provided a valid
numerical answer other than ‘‘0 child’’ to the question on
the number of children they intended to have answered
the question about their certainty level.
All the above mentioned variables were measured
exactly in the same way in the two EB rounds, 2006 and
2011, which allowed me to run the regression analysis on a
pooled dataset.
4.3. Explanatory variables
The explanatory variables of the models are as follows:
age, enrolment in education, level of education, marital
status, employment status, and self-location on the social
scale. All of the covariates refer to the time of the interview.
Unfortunately, the data do not carry any retrospective
information concerning the previous history of respon-
dents, which would have allowed me to estimate the role
of biographical trajectories on the process of forming
family size intentions in a dynamic framework. The
assumption of constancy over time is quite reasonable
for some covariates, like, for instance, completed educa-
tional level; for the other covariates, I simply assume that
they exert an influence as they are measured at the time of
the survey, independently on whether the different
statuses (marital, employment, social) have been reached
since long or short time.
Since the main focus of the analysis is on women,
models were restricted to a female sub-sample. EB data
from 2006 and 2011 were pooled together, while testing
for interaction effects between ‘round 2006’ and all of the
other explanatory variables in the models. No significant
interactions were detected; hence, interaction terms were
not retained in the final models. All the covariates included
into the models were measured exactly in the same way in
the EB 2006 and 2011, which allowed me to code them
exactly in the same way before pooling the data together.
The age of respondents is the only continuous covariate.
It was centred on the rounded mean value of 33 years. As
all of the other covariates are categorical, they were
transformed into suitable dummy variables. Some collap-
sing of the categories was often needed: in such cases,
several alternative collapsing schemes were tried in the
model selection process.
The educational level was measured with the following
survey question: ‘‘How old were you when you stopped your
full-time education?’’ and considered as a three-category
variable with low (up to 15 years) medium (between 16
and 19) and high (20 years or above) level of education.
This code reflects the three education categories as
available in the EB survey. A dummy variable indicating
whether respondents were still enrolled in education at
the time of the survey was also added.
The marital status was coded using four categories:
single, married, cohabiting, and separated. The ‘separated’
category included also divorced and widowed people not
living with another partner at the time of the survey, while
the married category included also remarried people.
The employment status has three categories:
employed, unemployed and not active in the labour
market.
The country-level explanatory variables of the models
are as follows: the gross domestic product (GDP) in
purchasing power standards (PPS) as of 2012, taken from
the Eurostat database; the share of women in the country
with higher levels of education (levels 4, 5, and 6, according
to the 1997 ISCED classification), taken from the Labour
Table 1
Structure of the data: women aged 20 to 45 by country and parity EB 2006
and EB 2011 pooled dataset.
Countries Parity
0 1 2
Austria 189 117 135
Belgium 137 83 136
Bulgaria 93 127 146
Cyprus 74 27 54
Czech Republic 125 132 216
Denmark 116 59 103
Estonia 83 120 134
Finland 103 68 97
France 112 99 148
Germany 181 131 175
Greece 188 78 145
Hungary 101 103 153
Ireland 106 87 114
Italy 237 121 135
Latvia 126 158 173
Lithuania 118 108 134
Luxembourg 60 42 83
Malta 49 36 72
Netherlands 135 58 135
Poland 112 91 102
Portugal 95 107 108
Romania 131 151 116
Slovakia 140 131 177
Slovenia 166 98 116
Spain 137 103 149
Sweden 74 53 95
UK 144 139 142
Total 3332 2627 3493
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Force Survey (year 2008); the share of enrolment in formal
childcare for pre-school children aged three to five, taken
from OECD Family Database (OECD, 2012), and the Gender
Empowerment Measure, which is an indicator of gender
equality intended to measure women’s and men’s abilities
to participate actively in economic and political life and
their decision-making over economic resources, which is
computed by the United Nation Development Programme
(UNDP, 2007, 2009).
The volume index of GDP per capita in purchasing
power standards is expressed in relation to the European
Union (EU-28) average, set to equal 100. If the index of a
country is higher than 100, this country’s level of GDP per
capita is higher than the EU average, and vice versa. The
basic figures are expressed in PPS; i.e., in a common
currency that eliminates the differences in price levels
between countries, which allows for more meaningful
volume comparisons of GDP between countries.
A description of all the variables used in the models is
reported in Table 2.
4.4. The micro–macro framework
Multilevel models were run in order to represent the
complex causal process underlying the behaviour of
individuals living in a social context, and to draw valid
inferences regarding the relationships at the relevant
hierarchical levels. As is usual in a multilevel setting, the
clustering of individuals in countries is a phenomenon of
interest, rather than a mere disturbance (Snijders & Bosker,
1999).
In Scheme 1, freely inspired by Coleman (1990), the
multilevel framework is adapted to the study of indivi-
dual’s lifetime reproductive intentions. The box visible at
the top right of the scheme is related to fertility rates,
which are not investigated in the current analysis, but
depend on the relationship explicitly considered in the
current study.
A crucial characteristic of the multilevel setting is that
the effect of the context on the individual outcome can be
estimated after a control for the individual-level char-
acteristics is included in the model (the diagonal line in the
scheme).
4.5. The model
The multilevel analysis relies on the random intercept
version of the proportional odds model for ordinal
responses (e.g., Agresti, 2002). All of the models were
run separately by parity: zero, one, and two children. As
was stated in the rational choice theories approach
(Yamaguchi & Ferguson, 1995), fertility intentions may
change after each new birth, in line with the concept of a
conditional-sequential fertility decision-making process
(Namboodiri, 1972). The preference for models stratified
by parity over pooled models with parity interactions is
reinforced by reasons of parsimony. Models based on a
pooled dataset would have required the inclusion of all the
interaction terms between each of the parities and all the
other demographic and socio-economic explanatory vari-
ables, given that the reproductive decision-making is quite
different and very sensitive to the number of children
already born. A problem arises when there is selection in a
parity-specific analysis; i.e., there are unobservable vari-
ables that could be correlated with the probability of
having a child in parity n, as well as with the probability of
intending to have a child of the next order, n + 1. The
consequence is a biased and inconsistent estimator. This
problem is not tackled here because of a lack of adequate
longitudinal retrospective information, but the related
issue is discussed in the concluding section.
The proportional odds model could be extended to
handle partial proportional odds (Williams, 2006), but
then the interpretation becomes somewhat tortuous. Since
only a few covariates in each model violated such an
assumption, and since they did so only slightly, the
proportional odds multilevel models were preferred.
5. Results
5.1. Cross-country differences in ultimately intended family
size
A previous study (Testa, 2012b) has provided evidence
supporting the consistency of the EB survey data and has
also suggested that the ultimately intended family size, as
computed from the EB survey data, and the projected
cohort fertility (Myrskyla¨ et al., 2012), as computed by
using national statistics as a basis for the projection, move
in the same direction.
Looking at the cross-country differences in the mean
ultimately intended family size of women of reproductive
ages (20–45) we can spot several clusters of countries with
similar values, as shown in Fig. 1.
Going from the lowest to the highest level of ultimately
intended family size, the first cluster of countries
encompasses Austria, Portugal, Romania and Bulgaria with
mean values clearly below the replacement level, ranging
between 1.8 and 1.9. The second group includes Italy,
Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Malta Czech Republic, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg and eastern Germany, with mean
values slightly below the replacement level, ranging
between 1.9 and 2.1. The third group of countries
encompasses western Germany, Belgium, Hungary, Slo-
vakia, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania with mean values at the
replacement level, ranging between 2.1 and 2.3. The last
group of countries includes Ireland, the United Kingdom,
France, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Cyprus
with mean values above 2.3.
This clustering roughly reflects the cross-country
family policy differences detected in a recent study
(The´venon, 2011). In the southern European countries,
grouped in the first and second clusters with the lowest
levels of ultimately intended family size, the family
policies are also characterised by limited periods of paid
child-related leave, limited provision of childcare services
for children under age three, low volumes of cash transfers,
but effective tax rates that provide incentives to work and
to have a second earner in the household.
The Nordic countries, grouped in the fourth cluster with
the highest levels of ultimately intended family size,
provide a substantial level of policy support to parents
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with children under age three, allowing them to easily
combine work and family. The forms of support include a
long full-time-equivalent period of father-specific leave
(around 10 weeks in Sweden, compared to an average of
1.7 weeks across the OECD countries), tax advantages for
dual-earner households, and high enrolment rates of
children under age three in formal childcare.
The continental European countries, with a mean
ultimately intended family size at EU-27 average levels,
are mainly grouped in the second and third cluster; the
only exceptions are Austria with a lower level and France
with a higher level of ultimately intended family size. In
these countries the policies are characterised by a
generous level of support, which is, however, not targeted
Table 2
Description of the individual- and country-level variables used in the analysis. EB 2006 and 2011 pooled dataset. Women aged 20–45.
Parity
0 1 2
(a) Individual-level variables. Percentage distributions
Age (average) 29 34 37
Year 2011 48 49 46
Year 2006 52 51 54
Married 17 60 75
Cohabiting 25 16 10
Single 52 11 4
Separated 6 12 11
Low education 5 9 12
Medium education 34 54 54
High education 38 36 33
Enrolled in education 23 2 1
Employed 62 66 68
Unemployed 10 14 10
Inactive 27 20 22
Low self-positioning on the social scalea 54 60 59
High self-positioning on the social scale 46 40 41
GDP per capita
(in pps)
Gender empowerment
measure
Pre-school children
in formal childcare
services (%)
Women with high
level of education (%)
2006 2011 2006 2008 2006 2010 2005 2008
(b) Country-level variables
Austria 126 131 0.815 0.744 75 78 33 32
Belgium 118 119 0.855 0.874 99 99 45 43
Bulgaria 38 47 0.595 0.613 75 71 28 26
Cyprus 93 91 0.584 0.603 85 73 48 49
Czech Republic 80 79 0.615 0.664 82 79 15 18
Denmark 124 125 0.861 0.896 91 94 37 37
Estonia 66 69 0.608 0.665 85 90 52 46
Finland 114 115 0.853 0.902 48 56 45 43
France 108 108 0.718 0.779 100 101 36 38
Germany East 116 122 0.816 0.852 89 94 33 32
Greece 92 75 0.614 0.677 47 48 39 40
Hungary 63 66 0.560 0.590 87 87 21 25
Ireland 146 130 0.753 0.722 49 79 52 53
Italy 105 99 0.653 0.741 99 97 17 21
Latvia 53 62 0.621 0.648 77 81 38 36
Lithuania 58 70 0.635 0.628 61 66 55 56
Luxembourg 271 272 0.653 0.653 86 87 34 34
Malta 79 86 0.493 0.531 91 94 27 27
Netherlands 131 129 0.844 0.882 58 67 33 35
Poland 52 66 0.610 0.631 41 60 28 33
Portugal 79 75 0.681 0.753 79 84 19 23
Romania 38 49 0.492 0.512 73 73 16 18
Slovakia 63 75 0.599 0.663 73 72 12 16
Slovenia 88 82 0.603 0.641 78 86 26 28
Spain 105 97 0.776 0.835 98 99 37 39
Sweden 123 129 0.883 0.909 86 93 46 44
UK 121 110 0.755 0.790 91 93 32 34
Source: Eurostat for GDP; United Nations Development Programme for Gender Empowerment Measures (years 2007 and 2009). 2008 is the most recent
available year for the GEM indicator, a new indicator of gender equality, not completely comparable to GEM, has been computed from 2009 on. OECD family
policy database for children aged three to five enrolled in formal childcare (if the data for the 2010 year was not available, the most recent available year was
considered); Labour Force Survey for women with high level of education.
a Respondents were asked to position themselves on the social scale. The scale had 10 levels: one for the lowest level in society and ten for the highest
level in society. Sensitivity analysis based on different coding of the variables also as numerical variable rather than dummy variable has suggested that the
latter captures the variation in the answers at best. This variable is not available in the 2006 Eurobarometer round.
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at facilitating the balancing of work and family. The level of
spending on families with small children is rather high, but
the support is aimed at compensating families for the costs
of raising children. The taxation system does not encou-
rage the labour market participation of both parents, as the
period of leave entitlement is rather long (with the
exception of the Netherlands), and the enrolment rates
of children under age three in formal care is low; the rates
are actually higher in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg;
and are lower in the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria.
In the eastern European countries, the policies are
rather heterogeneous, with Hungary having the most
comprehensive level support for parents with young
children. This heterogeneity is consistent with the fact
that these countries are present in each of the four clusters
outlined above.
A similar clustering of countries was obtained by
considering the ultimately intended family size of highly
educated women. Only eight countries were listened in a
different cluster: Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta, which
were in the adjacent cluster with higher UIFS values, and
the United Kingdom, Denmark, Cyprus and Latvia which
were in the adjacent cluster with lower UIFS.
5.2. The relationship between education and lifetime fertility
intentions
Looking at the parity distribution of women by level
of education in the EU27 as a whole, it is evident that
highly educated women are under-represented in the
high parities of three or above, but they are over-
represented in the lower parities of zero and one, if the
actual number of children is considered (Fig. 2, panel a);
while they are over-represented in the high parities if
the ultimately intended number of children (Fig. 2, panel
c) or the additionally intended number of children for
the childless sub-sample (Fig. 2, panel b) are considered.
These differences are related to the different timing of
childbearing adopted by highly educated women and
less educated ones, with the former usually delaying
family formation longer than the latter. The distribution
of women by actual family size also suggests that a
bipolarisation process might be behind the reproductive
choices of women with high levels of education, in
which they more frequently select the ‘‘no child’’ or ‘‘two
children’’ option than the ‘‘one child’’ option (Fig. 2,
panel a). The two-child family was the most preferred
family size of the majority of the respondents in all
the three education categories (Fig. 2, panel b and c)
while the two-child family was as frequent as the no-
child family among the highly educated women (Fig. 2,
panel a).
Indeed, in two out of three EU countries, the distribu-
tion of highly educated women by the actual number of
children showed a higher concentration at parities zero
and two than at parity one with the eastern European
countries being the main exceptions. However, an
analogous bipolarisation was not observed for the lifetime
fertility preferences with the only exception of two
countries, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, where
having one child was a very uncommon preference (8% and
Societal level                             Social structure
Ind ividual level Soc ial action
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Scheme 1. A micro–macro model of fertility. Source: inspired by Coleman
(1990).
Fig. 1. Mean ultimately intended family size in Europe (EU27). Women aged 20–45. Source: Eurobarometer data 2011.
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4% of highly educated women aged 20–45 preferred this
option) (Table 3).
Moving on to the analysis of the mean values, it can be
noticed that women with high levels of education have a
smaller mean actual family size but a larger mean
additionally intended family size than their less educated
counterparts in most of the EU countries (Table 4).
In 15 of the 27 countries (namely: Latvia, Romania,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Cyprus, Greece,
Portugal, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Austria, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), the mean
ultimately intended family size was higher for the women
with low to medium levels of education than it was for the
highly educated women. In five of the 27 EU countries
(Poland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Germany and Spain), the
mean ultimately intended family size did not substantially
differ by educational level. In another seven EU countries
(Ireland, Sweden, Estonia, Belgium, Slovakia, Malta, and
Italy), the mean ultimately intended family size was
greater among highly educated women than among less
educated women. In this group of countries, the smaller
actual family size of highly educated women relative to
less educated women was more than compensated for by
the larger number of intended children. The only exception
was Italy, where both the mean actual and the mean
intended family size were higher among women with high
levels of education than among women with low to
medium education levels. Using the three categories of
low, medium, and high levels of education separately, it
appeared that less educated and highly educated women
had higher mean values than women with medium levels
of education in several countries. Here, for the sake of
simplicity and because of the limited size of some national
samples, the results for women with medium-low and
high levels of education are described.
The cross-country bivariate correlation between edu-
cation and lifetime fertility intentions was found to be
positive: the countries with a high share of highly educated
women of reproductive ages were also the countries in
which women of reproductive ages tended to have higher
mean ultimately intended family sizes (Fig. 3). The
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was equal to 0.5 and
statistically significant. The correlation was very robust,
i.e., it did not change when the analysis was restricted to
either childless women or women with only one child,
when the Scandinavian countries were excluded, and
when the mean additionally intended family size was
weighted with the certainty levels of intentions. Looking at
the additionally intended family size by parity is crucial
because intentions may be higher among childless and
highly educated women than among childless and low to
medium educated ones just because the former postpone
the start of a family more often (or to a greater extent) than
the latter. Isolating the Scandinavian countries is impor-
tant because recent research has shown that in these
countries the educational gradient of fertility has been
reversed (see, for example, Kravdal & Rindfuss, 2008).
Eventually, considering certainty levels of intentions is
relevant because uncertainty may well be higher among
highly educated women, if we accept the interpretation
seeing it as a reflection in people’s mind that delayed
childbearing could lead to childbearing foregone (Morgan,
1982).
Interestingly, the scatter plot between the share of
highly educated women and the mean actual family size of
the highly educated women (Fig. 4) roughly resembles the
scatter plot showing the association between the share of
highly educated women and the mean ultimately intended
family size (Fig. 3). This result points out that countries in
which women make greater investments in human capital
are also those in which highly educated women have larger
families.
5.3. Results of the ordinal regression models with random
intercept
In Table 5, the estimates of the ordinal regression
models with a random intercept for the additionally
intended number of children are reported. The models
were run on the pooled female dataset of EB 2006 and EB
2011 and separately by parity zero, one, and two. Only the
additionally intended children were considered in the
response variable, to avoid problems of reverse causality
which we would have faced by explaining events occurred
already in the past (i.e., children already born) with
characteristics measured only at the time of the survey (all
the explanatory variables are measured at the time of the
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Fig. 2. Distribution of women aged 20–45 by actual, additionally, and
ultimately intended family size and educational levels. EB 2011.
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Table 3
Distribution of women aged 20–45 by actual and ultimately intended family size. EB 2011.
Actual family size U-shape Ultimately intended family size U-shape
0 1 2 0 1 2
Panel (a) high-educated women
Austria 38 26 36  4 37 58
Belgium 35 19 46  11 13 77
Bulgaria 30 38 33 0 19 81
Cyprus 59 11 30  5 7 89
Czech Rep. 25 35 41 4 11 85
Denmark 21 25 54  8 10 82
Estonia 23 33 44 1 9 90
Finland 30 18 52  10 11 79
France 32 24 44  2 13 85
Germany West 26 23 51  7 21 72
Germany East 29 32 39 7 25 68
Greece 54 17 29  5 21 74
Hungary 38 23 39  0 19 81
Ireland 25 29 46 3 7 90
Italy 36 29 35  6 16 78
Latvia 26 35 39 5 17 77
Lithuania 33 25 42  1 15 84
Luxembourg 36 20 45  9 11 81
Malta 48 16 36  5 19 76
Netherlands 45 14 41  14 8 78 
Poland 31 32 37 2 21 77
Portugal 50 21 29  11 27 62
Romania 41 46 12 2 36 62
Slovakia 39 23 38  2 16 82
Slovenia 32 32 36 4 17 80
Spain 37 21 42  3 17 80
Sweden 30 26 44  3 10 87
U. Kingdom 33 28 39  9 4 87 
Total number of countries 19 2
Actual family size U-shape Ultimately intended family size U-shape
0 1 2 0 1 2
Panel (b) medium and low-educated women
Austria 39 20 42  13 21 67
Belgium 21 23 56 9 16 75
Bulgaria 18 34 48 2 25 73
Cyprus 16 20 64 0 20 80
Czech Republic 21 25 54 1 17 82
Denmark 37 15 48  9 0 91
Estonia 15 28 57 2 14 84
Finland 23 20 57  4 18 78
France 15 24 61 4 10 85
Germany West 28 18 54  12 15 73
Germany East 30 30 39 14 20 66
Greece 26 22 52  3 16 81
Hungary 19 30 51 7 19 73
Ireland 21 23 56 8 7 85 
Italy 39 26 35  9 23 68
Latvia 11 37 52 2 22 76
Lithuania 23 27 49 3 17 80
Luxembourg 17 23 60 11 15 74
Malta 26 22 52  5 26 70
Netherlands 33 16 51  11 12 77
Poland 15 29 56 2 19 79
Portugal 17 34 49 5 28 66
Romania 13 36 51 4 33 63
Slovakia 24 27 49 2 25 73
Slovenia 14 31 56 2 22 75
Spain 19 31 50 5 16 79
Sweden 12 28 60 7 23 70
United Kingdom 21 29 50 10 15 75
Total number of countries 8 1
Note: The row percentages sum up to 100 in each panel. The countries with a U-shape distribution are those in which the proportion of women with only
one child (or only one ultimately intended child) is lower than the proportions of women with zero and two children (actual or ultimately intended).
Women at parity three or above have been excluded from this analysis.
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survey). Explanatory variables have been included gradu-
ally in the analysis: model I is the empty one, model II
includes only the individual-level variables, and model III
includes both the individual- and country-level variables.
As the table shows (Models II), at the individual-level
the additionally intended family size is negatively
associated with age (for all the three parities) and with
the status of being inactive (only at parity zero) and single
or separated (at parity one); by contrast, it is positively
associated with a high level of education (for all the three
parities), with enrolment in education (parity zero and
one), and with a high self-positioning on the social scale
(for all the three parities). Moreover, there is a positive and
statistical significant effect of ‘year 20060 in the model run
on parity one, which suggests a decrease in the intended
family size across the two EB waves, 2006 and 2011, for
women at this parity (Table 5).
The variance at the country-level was always highly
statistically significant, which justifies the adoption of a
multilevel approach. The set of country-level variables
explained a substantial part of the variance at the country-
level in all of the three models (Model I, II, and II) and for all
Table 4
Mean actual, mean additionally intended and mean ultimately intended family size by level of education.a EB 2011.
Actual family size
(AFS)
Additionally intended
family size (AIFS)
Ultimately intended
family size (UIFS)
Countries in which highly educated women
have a mean UIFS bigger, equal, or smaller
than the less educated counterparts
Low edu High edu Low edu High edu Low edu High edu High > low High = low High < low
Austria 1.2 1.1 0.6 0.4 1.8 1.5 
Belgium 1.6 1.4 0.5 0.8 2.1 2.2 
Bulgaria 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.9 1.9 1.8 
Cyprus 1.9 0.9 0.5 1.3 2.4 2.1 
Czech Rep. 1.5 1.2 0.6 0.8 2.1 2.0 
Denmark 1.5 1.6 1.3 0.6 2.8 2.2 
Estonia 1.7 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.3 2.4 
Finland 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.8 2.5 2.3 
France 1.9 1.3 0.7 1.1 2.6 2.4 
Germany 1.5 1.3 0.5 0.8 2.0 2.0 
Greece 1.4 0.9 0.7 1.1 2.1 2.0 
Hungary 1.6 1.2 0.7 1.0 2.3 2.2 
Ireland 1.9 1.7 0.8 1.2 2.7 2.9 
Italy 1.0 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.8 2.2 
Latvia 1.7 1.2 0.5 0.8 2.2 2.0 
Lithuania 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.0 2.2 2.2 
Luxembourg 1.8 1.3 0.3 0.7 2.1 2.0 
Malta 1.4 1.1 0.5 1.1 1.9 2.2 
Netherlands 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.9 2.1 1.9 
Poland 1.7 1.2 0.5 1.0 2.2 2.2 
Portugal 1.5 0.8 0.4 0.9 1.9 1.7 
Romania 1.6 0.7 0.2 1.0 1.8 1.7 
Slovakia 1.4 1.0 0.6 1.4 2.0 2.4 
Slovenia 1.6 1.2 0.5 0.9 2.1 2.1 
Spain 1.3 1.1 0.5 0.8 1.9 1.9 
Sweden 1.8 1.4 0.3 1.0 2.1 2.4 
United Kingdom 1.7 1.2 0.7 1.0 2.4 2.2 
No of countries 7 5 15
a Low education category includes low- and medium-educated women.
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Fig. 4. Cross-country correlation between the mean actual family size of
highly educated women and the share of highly educated women. Ages
20–45. Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is equal to 0.5 and
statistically significant. Source: Author’s elaborations on EB 2011.
Fig. 3. Cross-country correlation between women’s mean ultimately
intended family size and the share of highly educated women. Ages 20–
45. Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficient is equal to 0.5 and statistically
significant. Source: Author’s elaborations on EB 2011.
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of the three parities, as suggested by the decline in the
country-level variance observed after the country-level
variables had been included in the models.
Nevertheless, the only country-level variable with a
statistically significant effect on women’s lifetime fertility
intentions was the share of highly educated women
(Table 5). The statistical significance of this variable
disappeared in the parity-two models. Although signifi-
cance level should be interpreted with some caution, given
that only 27 countries at level-two units are available, this
result points out that the positive contextual effect of
women’s education on women’s fertility intentions is
mainly exerted at the beginning of the reproductive career
(parity zero and one) and that the other country-level
variables, childcare, gender, and GDP per capita, are not
really working as mediator factors in the education-
fertility intentions relationship.
To test whether the positive effect of women’s
education on intentions varied across countries, a random
slope was also included in the models. These more
sophisticated specifications did not, however, improve
the fit of the model, which implies that being highly
educated has the same effect on fertility intentions
regardless of the country considered.1
The country share of women enrolled in education was
initially also included in the set of the country-level
covariates. The effect of this variable was positive, but only
very weak and never statistically significant. Hence, it was
not retained in the final models.
In addition, the positive contextual effect of education
on intentions was not merely due to compositional effects:
by comparing models with only country-level variables
with those with both individual- and country-level
variables, the magnitude and the sign of the coefficient
related to the country share of highly educated women did
not substantially change.
Table 5
Estimates from ordinal multilevel regression models on the additionally intended number of children. Beta coefficients.
Models Parity 0 Parity 1 Parity 2
I II II I II III I II III
Individual-level variables
Age-33 (average) – 0.22*** 0.22*** – 0.21*** 0.21*** – 0.16*** 0.16***
(Age-33)^2 – 0.01*** 0.01*** – 0.01*** 0.01*** – 0.003* 0.003*
Year 2011 (reference) – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0
Year 2006 – 0.04 0.04 – 0.13 0.20* – 0.11 0.12
Married (reference) – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0
Cohabiting – 0.01 0.01 – 0.19 0.17 – 0.09 0.07
Single – 0.00 0.00 – 0.44** 0.47** – 0.20 0.19
Separated – 0.34 0.34 – 0.62*** 0.63*** – 0.41 0.41
Low education (reference) – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0
Medium education – 0.06 0.07 – 0.25 0.25 – 0.02 0.03
High education – 0.34* 0.33+ – 0.79*** 0.78*** – 0.55** 0.51*
Enrolled in education – 0.72** 0.73** – 1.25*** 1.22*** – 1.80 0.73
Employed (reference) – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0
Unemployed – 0.02*** 0.01*** – 0.07 0.08 – 0.16 0.18
Not participating in the labour force 0.43* 0.43* 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.03
Low pos. on the social scale (reference) – 0 0 – 0 0 – 0 0
High positioning on the social scale – 0.19** 0.19** – 0.42*** 0.41*** – 0.37** 0.36**
Country-level variables
Women with high level of education (%) – – 0.02** – – 0.01+ – – 0.01
Pre-school children in formal childcare (%) – – 0.002 – – 0.01 – – 0.01
Gender Empowerment Measure – – 0.85 – – 1.35 – – 0.58
Log GDP per capita – – 0.03 – – 0.18 – – 0.21
First cut-point 1.42*** 1.06*** 0.66 0.03 0.19 1.35 1.87*** 1.85*** 3.03***
Second cut-point 0.60*** 0.11 0.50 1.82*** 2.65*** 3.81*** 2.81*** 2.90*** 4.08***
Third cut-point 1.57*** 2.65*** 3.05*** 3.85*** 4.85*** 6.01*** 4.64*** 4.77*** 5.95***
Variance at the country-level 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.25*** 0.19*** 0.15***
Level-one units: individuals 3332 3332 3332 2627 2627 2627 3493 3493 3493
Level-two units: countries 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27
* p <. 05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001
1 This result has been supported by additional analysis carried out
separately on each single EU country (results are not shown in the paper
but available upon request).
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Importantly, the other country-level indicators
included in the model with the aim to explain the cross-
country variance in the women’s fertility intentions,
namely: pre-school children’s participation in formal care,
gender empowerment measure, and GDP per capita, did
not change the magnitude or the significance level of the
coefficient related to the share of women highly educated
in the country. This implies that education at country-level
does not simply capture the effects of some other close
correlates, like gender equality, availability of childcare, or
economic conditions in the country, as supposed in the
research hypotheses.
6. Summary and discussion
The analysis, based on the 2006 and 2011 EB data, has
revealed that the share of highly educated women in a
European country is positively associated with women’s
lifetime fertility intentions. There is a positive contextual
effect of women’s education which has an impact on
women’s fertility intentions above and beyond that—also
positive—of women’s own level of education at the
individual-level.
Unlike in developing countries, in Europe women who
invest more resources in human capital do not necessarily
plan to have fewer children than their less educated
counterparts. This finding is in line with those of recent
research on fertility (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Kravdal &
Rindfuss, 2008). Results of the ordinal regression models
on additionally intended number of children with a
random intercept (Table 5) resemble those of empirical
studies on higher-order actual fertility and, moreover, a
good correspondence between intended and actual ferti-
lity has been found at the aggregate level, which does not
necessarily imply a consistency also at the individual-level.
What could be the reason for this positive correlation
between women’s education and lifetime fertility inten-
tions at individual- and country-level?
I hypothesised that this result might be explained by
factors that increase the income effect and reduce the
substitution effect of high levels of education among
women in a given country: namely, access to childcare,
gender equality, and good economic conditions. None of
these a priori statements could be fully supported in the
empirical analysis. Indeed, even after controlling for
childcare, gender equality, and economic conditions at
the country-level, the share of highly educated women
appears as the only country-level variable with a
statistically significant effect in the multilevel models.
These results seem to suggest that countries in which
women are more likely to reach the highest educational
levels are also the countries in which other structural
circumstances encouraging fertility (that are not con-
trolled for in this analysis) are more widespread, such as
individuals’ sense of well-being, levels of trust (Aassve &
Pessin, 2012), levels of happiness (Margolis & Myrskyla¨,
2011), or life satisfaction (Testa, 2012a).
The marriage market could also play an important role,
given that highly educated women have a greater chance
of marrying, a lower probability of divorcing, and a higher
probability of having a partner who is better educated, and
thus, more likely to plan to have larger families. Actually,
the marriage market has been indicated as one of the
reasons why school reforms which prolonged the time
invested in education have had positive effects on fertility
levels (Fort et al., 2011).
An intriguing explanation—which needs to be sup-
ported by empirical data—is related to feedback spill-over
effects that the actual fertility of highly educated women
might have on the intended fertility of highly educated
women of younger reproductive ages: i.e., the more
children highly educated women manage to have, the
more children younger highly educated women who have
not yet completed their reproductive careers will plan to
have, because they see that it was possible for (presumably
older generations of) women to combine both career and
family. In other words, I assume that an increase over time
in the share of highly educated women in the country will
make successive generations of highly educated women
more likely (to plan) to have larger families than their
predecessors, who, as innovators of a new pattern of
behaviour (i.e., the postponement of childbearing; see
Billari & Philipov, 2004), faced many more challenges. The
positive cross-country correlation between the share of
highly educated women and their mean actual family size
(Fig. 4) would be in line with this interpretation but it
would remain unexplained why successive cohorts of
women are more and more successful in achieving a large
family size. Unfortunately, this issue cannot be investi-
gated in more depth with the data at hand but it is certainly
a fruitful line of research for future studies.
One should bear in mind that childbearing intentions
depend not only on the individuals’ preference structure
but also on country specific institutional contexts (Neyer,
2006). The countries in which the women with higher
levels of education have more children might also be the
countries in which policies introduced in past years have
made it easier to combine work and family life, which
might have had positive repercussions for fertility inten-
tions of highly educated women. This is consistent with the
similarity observed between the clustering of the countries
according to the mean ultimately intended family size
(Fig. 1) and the clustering of the countries according to the
mix of policies in support to families introduced in the past
(The´venon, 2011).
The data have some limitations. First, they are cross-
sectional and thus they do not allow a dynamic study of the
fertility decision-making process. Second, the limited
national sample sizes prevents any detailed and reliable
analysis at the national level, and moreover, the limited
information available at the individual level (the data do
not, for example, contain any information on the partner’s
characteristics) may cause the results to be biased due to
omitted relevant variables. Third, they do not allow a
modelling of the selection effects generated by the
postponement of childbearing among highly educated
women. Being at an earlier stage of reproduction implies
that highly educated women could still plan to have a
greater number of children, and that their less educated
counterparts observed at the same parity (i.e., the control
group) can be selected out of the group for some
unobserved characteristics, such as fecundity impairments,
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which may have a depressing effect on their stated lifetime
fertility intentions. Moreover, the causal direction is
assumed in this analysis to run from education to fertility,
although in actually there will be some degree of reverse
causation, especially in the case of educational enrolment
(Cohen et al., 2011), which we are not able to model with the
data at hand. Eventually, 27 countries are not enough to
produce very robust and reliable estimates at the country-
level, especially if several country-level variables are
included in the models. Since the regional division of
the EB data does not correspond to the NUTS 1 of the
Eurostat, it was not possible to conduct the analysis at
regional level while taking the regional-level variables from
the statistics provided by Eurostat. It is hoped that it will be
possible to address the issue in future studies on the basis of
other data.
Nevertheless, the findings reported in the current study
provide new insights into the women’s fertility decision-
making by bridging a link between macro-level factors and
micro-level determinants of reproductive intentions.
Building upon existing literature, they reveal that when
it comes to women’s lifetime fertility intentions education
level has a positive effect both at the individual- and
country-level. This means that the positive effects stem-
ming from the higher degree of (perceived) behavioural
control among highly educated women more than
counterbalance the negative effects stemming from their
increased level of autonomy and that these positive effects
are reinforced in countries with a high share of highly
educated women. Indeed, as seen in the analysis reported
here, the women’s preference structure is influenced by
aggregate education; this means that low-educated
women, who live in a society where the average
educational level of women is high, have higher fertility
intentions than if they live elsewhere. Although nothing
was learned about the underlying mechanism, education
at contextual level deserves attention in future research on
fertility in Europe.
The results are rich in implications for policy makers.
The increased investments in education may have positive
effects on fertility levels if the obstacles that prevent highly
educated women from combining family life with a career
appropriate to their human capital are removed through
adequate policy measures. As education tends to be passed
on from one generation to the next, these policy
interventions will ultimately increase a country’s human
capital resources, and thus its productivity, not just today,
but into the future.
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